

CRM 87-2 / January 1987

RESEARCH MEMORANDUM

MARSHAL OGARKOV AND THE NEW REVOLUTION IN SOVIET MILITARY AFFAIRS

Mary C. FitzGerald

AD-A187 009

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SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF THIS PAGE

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

1a. REPORT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION UNCLASSIFIED		1b. RESTRICTIVE MARKINGS A187009													
2a. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION AUTHORITY		3. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF REPORT Approved for public release; distribution unlimited.													
2b. DECLASSIFICATION / DOWNGRADING SCHEDULE															
4. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S) CRM 87-2		5. MONITORING ORGANIZATION REPORT NUMBER(S)													
6a. NAME OF PERFORMING ORGANIZATION Center for Naval Analyses	6b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) CNA	7a. NAME OF MONITORING ORGANIZATION Office of the Chief of Naval Operations (OP-91)													
6c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 4401 Ford Avenue Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268		7b. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) Navy Department Washington, D.C. 20350-2000													
8a. NAME OF FUNDING / ORGANIZATION Office of Naval Research	8b. OFFICE SYMBOL (If applicable) ONR	9. PROCUREMENT INSTRUMENT IDENTIFICATION NUMBER N00014-87-C-0001													
8c. ADDRESS (City, State, and ZIP Code) 800 North Quincy Street Arlington, Virginia 22217		10. SOURCE OF FUNDING NUMBERS <table border="1"><tr><td>PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. 65154N</td><td>PROJECT NO. R0148</td><td>TASK NO.</td><td>WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.</td></tr></table>		PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. 65154N	PROJECT NO. R0148	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.								
PROGRAM ELEMENT NO. 65154N	PROJECT NO. R0148	TASK NO.	WORK UNIT ACCESSION NO.												
11. TITLE (Include Security Classification) Marshal Ogarkov and The New Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs															
12. PERSONAL AUTHOR(S) Mary C. FitzGerald															
13a. TYPE OF REPORT Final	13b. TIME COVERED FROM TO	14. DATE OF REPORT (Year, Month, Day) 1987, January 14	15. PAGE COUNT 32												
16. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTATION															
17. COSATI CODES <table border="1"><tr><th>FIELD</th><th>GROUP</th><th>SUB-GROUP</th></tr><tr><td>05</td><td>04</td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr><tr><td></td><td></td><td></td></tr></table>		FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP	05	04								18. SUBJECT TERMS (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) Arms control, Conventional war, Foreign policy, International politics, Military doctrine, Military policy, Military strategy, NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organization), Nuclear war, USSR	
FIELD	GROUP	SUB-GROUP													
05	04														
19. ABSTRACT (Continue on reverse if necessary and identify by block number) <p>When the Soviets accepted "Mutual Assured Destruction" as a reality in present-day conditions, the Soviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy was resolved by a consensus: nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that it remains an instrument of politics only in theory, an instrument of politics that cannot be used. A growing body of evidence thus indicates that in 1977, coincidentally with Marshal N. V. Ogarkov's elevation to Chief of the General Staff, the Soviets adopted an independent conventional war option as a long-term military development goal. Ogarkov and others now speak of a new revolution in Soviet military affairs that involves changes in Soviet doctrine generated by the so-called emerging technologies and the trend toward new, conventional means. The most prominent Soviet military figures now equate the new conventional means with nuclear weapons in terms of tasks, ranges, and target sets. A review of Soviet military writings in the 1980s further indicates that the new conventional means will be used in a war that involves neither the territories nor the nuclear forces of the superpowers.</p>															
20. DISTRIBUTION / AVAILABILITY OF ABSTRACT <input type="checkbox"/> UNCLASSIFIED/UNLIMITED <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> SAME AS RPT. <input type="checkbox"/> DTIC USERS		21. ABSTRACT SECURITY CLASSIFICATION Unclassified													
22a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE INDIVIDUAL		22b. TELEPHONE (Include Area Code)	22c. OFFICE SYMBOL												

A Division of **CNA** Hudson Institute

CENTER FOR NAVAL ANALYSES

4401 Ford Avenue • Post Office Box 16268 • Alexandria, Virginia 22302-0268 • (703) 824-2000

25 March 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR DISTRIBUTION LIST

Subj: Center for Naval Analyses Research Memorandum 87-2

Encl: (1) CNA Research Memorandum 87-2, "Marshal Ogarkov and the New Revolution in Soviet Military Affairs," by Mary C. FitzGerald, January 1987

1. Enclosure (1) is forwarded as a matter of possible interest.
2. This Research Memorandum provides evidence that: throughout the 1980s, the Soviet military leadership has engineered a new revolution in Soviet military affairs that is connected with both the declining military utility of nuclear weapons and the qualitatively new combat characteristics of conventional means. Along with Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, Soviet military leaders now equate conventional high-tech means with nuclear weapons in terms of tasks, ranges, and target sets. A review of Soviet military writings in the 1980s further indicates that the focus of the new revolution is a war that involves neither the territories nor the nuclear forces of the superpowers. While it may include the Near, Middle, and Far East, and all sea and ocean TVDs, a future war will be decided on the European continent.



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ABSTRACT

When the Soviets accepted "Mutual Assured Destruction" as a reality in present-day conditions, the Soviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy was resolved by a consensus: nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that it remains an instrument of politics only in theory, an instrument of politics that cannot be used. A growing body of evidence thus indicates that in 1977, coincidentally with Marshal N.V. Ogarkov's elevation to Chief of the General Staff, the Soviets adopted an independent conventional war option as a long-term military development goal. Ogarkov and others now speak of a new revolution in Soviet military affairs that involves changes in Soviet doctrine generated by the so-called emerging technologies and the trend toward new, conventional means. The most prominent Soviet military figures now equate the new conventional means with nuclear weapons in terms of tasks, ranges, and target sets. A review of Soviet military writings in the 1980s further indicates that the new conventional means will be used in a war that involves neither the territories nor the nuclear forces of the superpowers.

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INTRODUCTION

Throughout the 1980s, the word "revolution" has frequently been used to describe new developments in Soviet military affairs. According to General William Odom, the new revolution involves changes in Soviet doctrine generated by the so-called emerging technologies and the trend toward new, non-nuclear weapons.¹ In 1982 and 1985, Marshal N. V. Ogarkov connected this revolution with both the rapid quantitative growth of nuclear weapons and the qualitatively new combat characteristics of conventional means.² These changes, he asserts, are exerting an influence primarily on the development and improvement of the forms and methods of combat action, the organizational structure of troops and naval forces, and the improvement of command-and-control systems and organs. Colonel-General M. A. Gareyev, Deputy Chief of the General Staff, clearly echoed Ogarkov when he spoke of a "turning point" in the development of military science that was connected especially with the appearance in NATO countries of new types of precision conventional weapons.³ Gareyev has also published the first official requiem for the seemingly indestructible V. D. Sokolovskiy. In a 1985 book on M. V. Frunze, Gareyev argued that Sokolovskiy's classic *Military Strategy* was generally valid for its time, given the appearance of nuclear-missile weapons, but that many of its central propositions have now become obsolete.⁴ Marshal Ogarkov may not be alone in his military-strategic views,⁵ but he remains the vanguard of the new revolution in Soviet military affairs.

The developments in Soviet doctrine and capabilities that constitute the new revolution have perhaps emerged most tangibly since L. I. Brezhnev's 1977 address at Tula.⁶ Here Brezhnev closed the door on a debate that had lasted for over a decade in Soviet military thought. From 1964 to 1976, a large segment of the Soviet military had clung to the premise that the dialectic of arms development would eventually generate a means of defense against nuclear weapons.⁷ Since Tula, however, Soviet officials have maintained that the historical struggle between weapons of offense and weapons of defense will henceforth be tilted in favor of weapons of offense.⁸ In 1985, Marshal Ogarkov went so far as to describe a "balance" in nuclear means of offense and defense, perhaps implying a neutralization of nuclear weapons in general.⁹ Without a damage-limiting capacity in nuclear war, the Soviet debate on the viability of nuclear war as an instrument of policy was resolved by a consensus: nuclear war is so unpromising and dangerous that it has become an instrument of policy only in theory, an instrument of policy that cannot be used. As a result, the most prominent political, military, and academic figures in the Soviet Union now present a consensus on the diminishing military utility of nuclear war in present-day conditions.

THE FALL OF NUCLEAR CONTINGENCIES

On the plane of doctrine, the reverberations of Tula have clearly affected Soviet concepts of mutual deterrence and limited nuclear war. Raymond L. Garthoff has noted that during the key formative period of Soviet arms control policy, "there were a number of very clear and explicit endorsements in *Military Thought* by influential Soviet military leaders of the concepts of mutual assured retaliation and mutual deterrence."¹⁰ After Tula, however, G. Gerasimov wrote unequivocally that "then, as now, both sides in the nuclear confrontation possessed an assured capability to inflict an annihilating retaliatory strike on the aggressor (*the Soviet formula*), or to inflict 'unacceptable damage' on the attacking party as long as the situation for 'mutual assured destruction' exists (*the American formula*)."¹¹ This Soviet formula for "Mutual Assured Destruction" (MAD) is repeated with consistency by the Soviet military leadership, and Marshal Ogarkov is no exception.¹² In 1983, he published an article in *Red Star* that included a most concrete acknowledgement of MAD: "Given the modern development and spread of nuclear arms in the world, a defender will always retain that quantity of nuclear means which are capable of inflicting 'unacceptable damage,' as former U.S. Defense Secretary R. McNamara once put it, on an aggressor in a retaliatory strike.... In present-day conditions, therefore, only suicides can gamble on a nuclear first strike."¹³

Twice in 1984 and again in his 1985 book – *History Teaches Vigilance*, hereafter cited as *History* – Ogarkov was determined to make a point regarding unacceptable damage. In his 1984 interview in *Red Star*, he asserted that "with the quantity and diversity of nuclear-missile means achieved, it is already impossible to destroy them [the opponent's nuclear-missile means] with one strike. An annihilating retaliatory strike on an aggressor with even a limited number of the nuclear warheads left to a defender, a strike inflicting unacceptable damage, is inevitable in present-day conditions."¹⁴ In his 1984 post-transfer article in *Kommunist of the Armed Forces*, Ogarkov reiterated the above formulation for MAD, but he clarified the phrase "a strike inflicting unacceptable damage" by specifying "a retaliation depriving the aggressor of the capability thereafter not only of conducting the war, but also any kind of serious operations...."¹⁵ This fine-tuning of unacceptable damage was repeated in the 1985 *History*.¹⁶

A review of post-Tula Soviet literature reveals that the Soviet politico-military leadership has grown more explicit over time concerning the mutuality of a nuclear war's destructiveness.¹⁷ Since 1981, Marshal Ogarkov has also expanded the consequences of nuclear war to include "all mankind"

and "the whole of civilization." In his 1981 article in *Kommunist*, Ogarkov warned that "[i]n terms of ferocity and scale of potential destruction, it [a new world war] can be compared with no wars of the past. The very nature of modern weapons is such that, if they are put into action, the future of all mankind would be at stake."¹⁸ In a 1983 article in *Red Star*, Ogarkov advised that in a future war, "the consequences simply cannot be foreseen. It could threaten disaster for the whole of civilization."¹⁹ In the 1984 post-transfer article in *Kommunist of the Armed Forces*, Ogarkov asserted that world wars "are fraught with the threat of annihilation for the whole of world civilization."²⁰ He also stressed that a world nuclear war would "threaten the total annihilation of human civilization."²¹ In the 1985 *History*, Ogarkov not only repeated the foregoing statements but also added that in the hands of the imperialists, nuclear-missile means "have created a real threat to the existence of all mankind."²² Having downgraded the utility of nuclear war in the face of MAD, how then does Ogarkov evaluate limited nuclear options?

In Soviet military thought, one of the "specific features" of a future war is its escalation potential. Since L. I. Brezhnev's address at the 26th Party Congress in early 1981, Soviet political and military elites have consistently stressed the impossibility of keeping a nuclear war limited.²³ Among Soviet military men, Marshal Ogarkov has used some of the strongest language possible to express the inadmissibility of a limited nuclear war. In his 1982 book — *Always in Readiness to Defend the Fatherland*, hereafter cited as *Always* — he discussed the Pentagon's plans to wage a limited nuclear war in Europe: "One can, of course, reason theoretically in this manner. But any sober-minded person can understand, without any particular difficulty, that to realize this in practice — that is, to confine nuclear war within some kind of limited framework — is impossible."²⁴ His 1985 *History* reiterates that "once begun, it is impossible in practice to confine a nuclear war within some kind of limited framework."²⁵

Throughout his writings, Ogarkov has also relied on other formulas to depict the impossibility of keeping a nuclear war limited. In his 1984 *Red Star* interview, he insisted that the calculation of the transatlantic strategists on the possibility of waging a so-called limited nuclear war "now has no basis whatsoever. It is fantasy: any so-called limited use of nuclear means will lead inevitably to the immediate use of the entire nuclear arsenal of the sides. Such is the grim logic of war."²⁶ The last formula was repeated in both of Ogarkov's post-transfer publications.²⁷ In his 1985 *History*, Ogarkov wrote also that in the opinion of the Pentagon, the possession by the United States of powerful strategic nuclear forces, as well as the creation of the so-called Euro-strategic nuclear forces, allegedly enhances its potential for achieving

political and military objectives in a limited nuclear war in the European theater of war without its escalating into a world war: "Hoping for this is of course sheer fantasy," he declared. "Any attempt to put nuclear weapons into action will inevitably end in a catastrophe that can call into question the fate of life itself on the whole earth."²⁸

In light of the foregoing, what kind of role does Marshal Ogarkov envision for the nuclear weapons of the USSR? In his landmark 1981 *Kommunist* article, Ogarkov introduced an innovation in the rank ordering of the branches of the Soviet Armed Forces by displacing the Strategic Missile Troops: "The first element of the combat might of the Soviet Armed Forces is the strategic nuclear forces, which serve as the basic factor for deterring the aggressor, and have the capability to immediately deliver an annihilating retaliatory strike if strategic nuclear weapons are used against the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist community."²⁹ In a 1983 article in *Red Star*, Ogarkov described the components of the strategic nuclear forces as follows: "Our strategic nuclear forces... consist of tactical and operational formations of the Strategic Missile Troops, the Navy, and the Air Force."³⁰ Ogarkov has subsequently repeated these formulas,³¹ and has also attributed the possession of strategic nuclear forces to the United States.³² In *History*, he not only refers to the U.S. strategic nuclear forces, but also introduces a Russian acronym for these forces: "S.Ya.S."³³ At the very least, one could infer that the strategic nuclear forces will be around on a regular basis. It should be noted, however, that this appellation is never followed by the words "of the Armed Forces," the standard Soviet formula for designating a branch of the Soviet Armed Forces.

Of the top military leadership, Defense Minister Sokolov and General of the Army Shabanov have echoed Ogarkov's innovation. Writing in *Izvestiya* in 1983³⁴ and *Red Star* in 1984,³⁵ Sokolov likewise displaced the Strategic Missile Troops by the strategic nuclear forces. Shabanov reiterated that lineup in an article in *Ekonomicheskaya gazeta* in early 1985³⁶ and echoed the use of an acronym in a later *Izvestiya* article.³⁷ As recently as August 1986, Shabanov repeated Ogarkov's rank ordering of the branches, as well as his description of the triad that constitutes the "strategic nuclear forces."³⁸ In his 1982 *Always*, moreover, Ogarkov made a statement unprecedented for Soviet military thought: the Ground Troops "are, in essence, the basic branch of our Armed Forces."³⁹ Then-General Petrov was the only member of the top military leadership to repeat this statement.⁴⁰ In a 1982 article in *Red Star*, however, General of the Army Yepishev placed the Ground Troops before the Strategic Missile Troops, thus upsetting the accepted rank ordering of the branches.⁴¹

Ogarkov has not mentioned nuclear weapons in the arms inventories of the other branches since his 1981 introduction of the strategic nuclear forces as the "first element" of the USSR's combat might, a practice not generally followed by all Soviet writers. Although this is also true of his 1983 article in *Red Star*, Ogarkov here directs special attention to the new types of precision [conventional] weapons and microcircuitry with which the other branches are increasingly being equipped.⁴² Later in 1983 he writes that "the creation of non-nuclear means of armed combat with great destructive force... is sharply changing the nature of war, the methods of unleashing it, and its possible consequences."⁴³ In his 1985 *History*, Ogarkov published a new and revised description of the modern theater operation, in which military action is conducted in one or more theaters without recourse to nuclear weapons.⁴⁴ In the same book, he also described a new role for U.S. strategic nuclear forces: the United States plans to achieve its basic objectives in a European war by using its strategic nuclear forces "only as a potential threat."⁴⁵ Or, as *Red Star* put it in 1984: "Modern conceptions of a non-nuclear war envisage reconciling the attainment of strategic results using conventional weapons with the readiness to repel a nuclear attack."⁴⁶

Throughout the 1980s, numerous Soviet military thinkers have likewise described a new dimension in modern strategy for a European war. (Here it should be noted that Soviet writers often exploit "U.S. doctrine" as a foil for present and projected Soviet doctrine.) As early as 1981, *Foreign Military Review* noted that during the "Autumn Forge-80" maneuvers, the NATO troops succeeded in accomplishing all of the tasks of a strategic operation "without resorting to the use of nuclear weapons."⁴⁷ Writing in *Red Star* in 1983, General-Lieutenant M. Proskurin observed that the latest incarnation of NATO's "flexible response" strategy envisions the use of only conventional means of destruction for conducting combat action with the Warsaw Pact states.⁴⁸ Marshal Kulikov has warned that NATO's military leadership intends to defeat the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact states at the very outset of the war without using nuclear weapons.⁴⁹ In mid-1984, *Foreign Military Review* maintained that NATO plans to achieve its military-strategic objectives in a "limited" war in Europe without recourse to nuclear weapons.⁵⁰ The "Rogers Plan," wrote Proskurin in late 1985, envisions defeating the Warsaw Pact troops at the beginning of the war without using nuclear weapons.⁵¹ In describing the "Autumn Forge-85" exercises, *Foreign Military Review* pointed to a convergence of U.S. and NATO strategy on the matter of achieving political objectives in a war against the socialist community without using nuclear weapons.⁵² Writing in the *Military-Historical Journal* in 1986, General-Lieutenant V. A. Aleksandrov likewise stressed the exclusion of nuclear weapons from U.S. and NATO strategy for theater warfare.⁵² In a

1986 article that reads like an ode to what some have called the "Ogarkov Doctrine," Colonel V. Alekseyev explained that NATO plans to achieve its military-strategic objectives in Europe by using only conventional weapons "under the umbrellas" of both the Eurostrategic and U.S. strategic nuclear forces.⁵⁴ From Ogarkov's use of the strategic nuclear forces "only as a potential threat" to Alekseyev's Eurostrategic and strategic nuclear "umbrellas," the Soviets appear to view intra-war deterrence as the main role for nuclear forces in present-day conditions. In light of the foregoing, how does the Soviet military propose to fight a future war?

THE RISE OF CONVENTIONAL HIGH-TECH

On the plane of capabilities, the reverberations of Brezhnev's address at Tula emerge clearly in the Soviet shift away from nuclear contingencies. A growing body of evidence indicates that in 1977, coincidentally with Tula and Ogarkov's elevation to Chief of the General Staff, the Soviets adopted an independent conventional war option as a long-term military development goal. One form of evidence comes from Soviet writers themselves, and especially from their perceptions of the growing conventional threat from the West.⁵⁵ According to Marshal Ogarkov, U.S. plans for a future war have included both nuclear and conventional scenarios. But Ogarkov has consistently depicted the United States as moving toward a greater reliance on conventional options, especially in terms of the duration and scope of future combat action. In 1979, he wrote that the United States entertained the possibility of protracted military action with the use of only conventional weapons.⁵⁶ In the 1982 *Always*, however, he pointed to a U.S. capability for waging a war with the use of only conventional weapons not only in Europe, but also "in the Near, Middle, and Far East, and all sea and ocean theaters of military action."⁵⁷ In the 1985 *History*, Ogarkov repeated this scenario⁵⁸ and also introduced a new U.S. capability to wage a protracted conventional war in any area of the world that posed a threat to its vital interests.⁵⁹ The 1985 *History* is significant because, for the first time since 1979, Ogarkov's description of U.S. doctrine does not include the recurrent charge that the United States is relying primarily on nuclear weapons in their various modifications.

Numerous Soviet military figures have explicitly echoed Ogarkov's perception of an increasing U.S. reliance on conventional weapons and options.⁶⁰ Writing in *Red Star* in 1981, Marshal Ustinov accused the United States of formulating a new military strategy for conducting a protracted, non-nuclear conflict with the socialist countries.⁶¹ One month later, he alleged that the United States was prepared to simultaneously conduct "two large, protracted,

'non-nuclear wars,' in Europe and the Near East, and to participate in small conflicts in any other area of the globe."⁶² In 1982, Ustinov wrote that "... Washington envisages the possibility of a 'protracted conventional war' in various areas of the world."⁶³

In the 1985 update of his earlier book on U.S. and NATO military strategy, General-Major R. G. Simonyan added the following types of wars to the inventory of Pentagon and NATO strategists: general conventional, conventional in a theater of war, and conventional in a theater of military actions (TVD).⁶⁴ Colonel V. Alekseyev included the same U.S./NATO conventional options in a *Red Star* article that appeared on the eve of the 27th Party Congress.⁶⁵ In their analysis of the "Autumn Forge-83" and "Autumn Forge-84" exercises, various Soviet writers included both nuclear and conventional scenarios in U.S. and NATO war-fighting plans.⁶⁶ But *Foreign Military Review* announced in May 1986 that the "Autumn Forge-85" exercises concentrated primarily on waging a conventional war in the European and Atlantic theaters.⁶⁷ Throughout the 1980s, in fact, more and more Soviet military spokesmen have warned that the Western threat consists primarily in an all-conventional conflict in which major strategic operations are successfully conducted within one or more TVDs without recourse to nuclear weapons.⁶⁸

In contrast to his strong language regarding the escalation potential of limited nuclear war, Ogarkov has consistently depicted conventional war as more stable. In his 1979 encyclopedia entry, he advised that "Soviet military strategy assumes that a world war may be started and conducted for a certain period of time with conventional weapons alone. But the expansion of military action could lead to its escalation to a general nuclear war, waged primarily with strategic nuclear weapons."⁶⁹ Compared with "impossible" to limit and "inevitable" use of the entire nuclear arsenal, the verbiage applied to the escalation potential of conventional warfare is bland indeed: "could" lead to escalation implies that it also might not. The 1985 *History* reiterates his position: a war begun with the use of conventional weapons "could escalate" to a war with the use of nuclear weapons.⁷⁰ Numerous Soviet military figures have likewise contrasted the stability of conventional conflict with the innate instability of nuclear warfare.⁷¹

Another form of evidence for the Soviet conventional option comes from their discussions on the type of weaponry that will be employed in a future war. As noted earlier, the new revolution in Soviet military affairs involves changes in Soviet doctrine generated by the so-called emerging technologies and by the trend toward new, non-nuclear weapons. The present review of Ogarkov's writings indicates that since 1971, the former Chief of the General

Staff has been actively lobbying for a timely incorporation of the latest technology into Soviet military theory and practice.⁷² In 1983, Ogarkov stressed that "[i]nertia of thought, and a stubborn, mechanical, unthinking attachment to the old ways are dangerous in present-day conditions."⁷³ Later in 1983 he reiterated that the emergence of "new means of armed combat requires the improvement of existing forms of combat action..." and that "bold experiments and solutions are necessary, even if this means discarding obsolete traditions, views, and propositions."⁷⁴ Western analysts have popularized the contention that Ogarkov was "demoted" precisely because of his call for new conventional technology. The present study reveals no evidence of a dispute on this issue within the Soviet military.

Along with Ogarkov,⁷⁵ the most prominent Soviet military figures have focused increasingly on the new conventional means earmarked for the Air-Land Battle.⁷⁶ In a 1983 *Izvestiya* article, Ogarkov explained that existing strategic as well as operational and tactical means of armed combat are being improved and new ones created on the basis of the latest achievements of electronics and other technical sciences. In this context, he went on to state that improved automated systems of command and control and "highly effective new conventional means of armed combat are being developed and introduced."⁷⁷ Writing in *Pravda* in 1983, Marshal Ustinov noted that the United States is creating new conventional weapons systems such as reconnaissance-strike complexes with great precision and range.⁷⁸ Defense Minister Sokolov has stated that "[t]he United States intends to sharply increase the effectiveness of conventional means of destruction in the upcoming years. An intensive development and equipping of the armed forces with automated, precision weapons systems is being conducted to this end."⁷⁹ In a 1985 *Red Star* article, Marshal Akhromeyev warned that the United States is proceeding with work to develop new precision, conventional arms.⁸⁰ In order to achieve superiority over the USSR in the sphere of conventional arms, wrote Marshal Kulikov in 1984, NATO is systematically equipping its troops with "a new generation of conventional weapons, and above all long-range precision weapons, modern means of air defense and radioelectronic combat, and projected command-and-control and communications systems."⁸¹

Especially in the context of the Air-Land Battle, numerous Soviet military thinkers have equated the combat characteristics of the new precision means with those of both tactical and unspecified nuclear weapons.⁸² In his 1984 interview in *Red Star*, Ogarkov maintained that the development of conventional means of destruction is causing a sharp increase in the destructive potential of conventional weapons, "making them almost as effective as weapons of mass destruction."⁸³ His 1985 *History* continues this theme. The

United States, he says, is conducting wide-scale research into making "conventional weapons approach nuclear in terms of their combat characteristics and effectiveness."⁸⁴ In this context, Soviet writers have focused specifically on the tasks, ranges, and target sets characteristic of the new conventional means.

As early as 1980, General-Major V. Makarevskiy asserted that the new conventional means can be used to accomplish many combat tasks that were formerly assigned to only tactical nuclear weapons.⁸⁵ Marshal Petrov argued in 1983 that the new conventional means can accomplish certain tasks that were previously reserved to only (unspecified) nuclear arms.⁸⁶ *Foreign Military Review* announced in late 1983 that precision conventional means can achieve the basic objectives of a general conventional war, to include defeating the armed forces of the Warsaw Pact and other socialist countries, occupying their territories, and establishing control over their populations.⁸⁷ The journal went on to stress that the objectives of the first strategic operation in general nuclear and conventional wars are identical: to destroy the opponent's nuclear potential, defeat his armed forces, knock out his command-and-control systems, and seize his most important strategic targets and territories.⁸⁸ The basic NATO objectives of an all-conventional war in Europe were defined as liquidating socialism in one or more Warsaw Pact countries and significantly weakening the Soviet Union.⁸⁹

In his "Ogarkov Doctrine" article of early 1986, Colonel V. Alekseyev maintained that the U.S. and NATO can achieve their basic strategic and military-political objectives in Europe using only precision conventional means.⁹⁰ "Strategic" objectives included defeating the armed forces of the socialist countries, occupying their territory, and establishing control over their populations. "Military-political" objectives included liquidating socialism in Eastern Europe, significantly weakening the Soviet Union, and forcing the latter to terminate the armed struggle on terms favorable to the West.

In addition, Soviet military writers have repeatedly stressed that precision conventional means offer certain advantages over other weapons when accomplishing these tasks. Military spokesmen such as General-Lieutenant Proskurin have asserted that precision conventional means facilitate the delivery of strikes to a significant depth without any need to increase the number and staffing of troops or quantity of forces and means.⁹¹ Writing in *Red Star* in early 1986, V. Kuznetsov argued that (1) using precision conventional weapons will avoid the political complications associated with nuclear weapons use; (2) these conventional means can accomplish their tasks without radioactive contamination of the ground and thus present no risk to

one's own troops at the front; and (3) precision weapons do not require bracketing, which greatly facilitates the achievement of surprise in combat action.⁹²

In general, Soviet military writers ascribe to precision conventional means the same ranges as those of tactical, medium-range, and long-range nuclear weapons. Numerous spokesmen have asserted somewhat vaguely that the new conventional weapons can strike targets "throughout the depth" of the Warsaw Pact countries;⁹³ others have specified those depths. Writing in *Red Star* in late 1983, General-Lieutenant Proskurin warned that the "Rogers Plan" envisions the delivery of conventional strikes throughout the entire depth of the opponent's *operational* dispositions.⁹⁴ Marshal Kulikov has explained that these operational dispositions include second echelons and reserves not yet committed to combat action.⁹⁵ (NATO's first operational echelon, wrote Colonel Alekseyev in late 1986, includes NORTHAG, CENTAG, and the 2nd and 4th Allied Tactical Air Commands.⁹⁶) In a 1986 *Red Star* article, General-Major Makarevskiy noted that the "Rogers Plan" envisions the delivery of conventional strikes throughout the entire depth of the Warsaw Pact's *operational-strategic* dispositions.⁹⁷ In a 1984 *Red Star* article entitled "Modern Weapons and Tactics," General-Major I. Vorob'yev explained that precision conventional means are changing the face of modern warfare and can now be used against the entire depth of the opponent's combat dispositions.⁹⁸ Both General-Major F. Gontar⁹⁹ and General-Lieutenant V. Aleksandrov¹⁰⁰ have warned that the Air-Land Battle envisions the delivery of conventional strikes throughout the entire *strategic* depth of the Warsaw Pact.

Other Soviet military spokesmen have specifically stressed the similarity in ranges of nuclear and precision conventional means. Writing in *Red Star* in late 1982, General-Major Makarevskiy asserted that with the help of operational-tactical and cruise missiles, the new conventional means can have the same ranges as (unspecified) nuclear weapons.¹⁰¹ With the help of missiles of various ranges, he reiterated in early 1984, the new precision munitions can cover the same distances as (unspecified) nuclear weapons.¹⁰² Makarevskiy became even more explicit in a 1986 *Red Star* article when he wrote that medium-range missiles armed with conventional warheads have ranges of up to 2,500 km, or the range of the U.S. GLCM when armed with a nuclear warhead.¹⁰³

Marshal Ogarkov asserted in 1984 that the ever-expanding range of conventional means facilitates the immediate involvement of an entire country in combat action, a phenomenon not possible in past wars.¹⁰⁴ In a

1985 article in the *Military-Historical Journal*, General-Lieutenant A. I. Yevseyev likewise wrote that the conventional means earmarked for the Air-Land Battle facilitate decisive combat action to the depth of an entire country at once.¹⁰⁵ Finally, Ogarkov has written that rapid changes in the development of conventional weapons are making many weapons "global,"¹⁰⁶ or capable of covering the same distances as intercontinental nuclear weapons.

Numerous Soviet military spokesmen have also equated the target sets of nuclear and precision conventional weapons. Writing in *Red Star* in 1984, General-Major Gontar' observed that NATO plans to use the new conventional means not only against troop groupings, command-and-control points, airfields, and communications networks of the Warsaw Pact countries, but also against the nuclear-missile means of the USSR.¹⁰⁷ According to the "Rogers Plan," wrote General-Major Makarevskiy in 1986, the new precision means will be targeted against the opponent's first, second, and third echelons as well as his rear.¹⁰⁸ In his *Red Star* article in late 1986, Colonel Alekseyev focused on the opponent's command-and-control systems and means of nuclear attack as targets of the new conventional weapons.¹⁰⁹

Other Soviet military writers specify the types of precision conventional weapons that will be used against certain targets. General-Lieutenant Proskurin has asserted that Pershing IIs and air-, ground-, and sea-launched cruise missiles armed with conventional warheads, as well as F-16s and Tornados armed with conventional munitions will be used against the opponent's deep fixed and mobile targets, command-and-control points, airfields, and air-defense means.¹¹⁰ Writing in *Red Star* in 1984, General-Major Gontar' noted that ballistic missiles and air-, ground-, and sea-launched cruise missiles armed with conventional warheads will be used against command-and-control points, communications systems, nuclear-missile means, mobile armed objectives, and nuclear targets of the USSR.¹¹¹ Colonel Drozhzhin has warned that Pershing IIs, cruise missiles, and Minuteman missiles armed with conventional warheads will be targeted against the opponent's airfields.¹¹² Writing in the *Military-Historical Journal* in 1986, General-Lieutenant Aleksandrov observed that all types of aviation, cruise missiles with conventional warheads, and reconnaissance-strike complexes will be used against state and military targets throughout the opponent's strategic depth.¹¹³ Among others, Colonel V. Alekseyev has concluded that conventional cruise and ballistic missiles, as well as F-111s, F-15s, F-16s, F-4s, and Tornados armed with conventional munitions will be used against the opponent's troop groupings, air forces, air-defense means, communications networks, and command-and-control systems.¹¹⁴

Finally, numerous Soviet military figures have repeatedly stressed that the new conventional means will be used to deliver "surprise" or "preemptive" strikes against the opponent's most important state and military targets. In the 1985 *History*, Ogarkov wrote that the Air-Land Battle envisions simultaneous, surprise strikes with the latest conventional means by air, naval, and ground forces.¹¹⁵ In 1984 and 1986, General-Major Makarevskiy warned that the "Rogers Plan" likewise envisions preemptive strikes throughout the depth of the Warsaw Pact countries with precision conventional means.¹¹⁶ In order to immediately carry combat action to Warsaw Pact territory, wrote General-Lieutenant Proskurin in 1984, the Air-Land Battle attaches great importance to the achievement of surprise using precision conventional means.¹¹⁷ In his 1986 *Red Star* article, Colonel V. Alekseyev claimed that NATO's preferred method of fighting a conventional war in Europe is by a surprise attack on the Warsaw Pact countries.¹¹⁸ *Foreign Military Review* announced in early 1986 that the very essence of the Air-Land Battle is the delivery of preemptive strikes throughout the depth of the Warsaw Pact countries.¹¹⁹ As long as the West continues to improve its conventional weapons, the author continued, the threat of a surprise conventional war against the Warsaw Pact states will continually grow.¹²⁰ Conversely, it would seem, as long as the Soviets continue to incorporate precision conventional weaponry into their military strategy, the threat of a surprise conventional war against NATO will continually grow.

NATO AND THE NEW REVOLUTION

Throughout the 1980s, developments in Soviet military affairs have provided growing evidence that the focus of post-Tula shifts in doctrine and capabilities is a war that involves neither the territories nor the nuclear forces of the superpowers. The previous sections have demonstrated that (1) the Soviets not only have downgraded the military utility of nuclear weapons, but also have assigned them the role of intra-war deterrence; and (2) the Soviets believe that the new precision, conventional weapons can accomplish the tasks of nuclear weapons with less collateral damage and fewer political complications. As already indicated, these tasks consist in achieving strategic and military-political objectives on the European continent. While it may include the Near, Middle, and Far East, and all sea and ocean TVDs, a future war will be decided on the European continent.

Once again, Soviet military figures themselves provide evidence through their perceptions of the Western threat. *Foreign Military Review* announced in 1983 that the "Rogers Plan," which consists in waging a general war with

conventional means, will save the United States from a retaliatory nuclear strike by limiting the war to only the European continent.¹²¹ Among others, such spokesmen as General-Lieutenant Proskurin¹²² and General-Major Gontar¹²³ have echoed this perception over the years. By the end of the 1980s, wrote Coloneli Alekseyev in early 1986, the NATO troops will be fully equipped with precision conventional weapons, which will give them the capability to wage a protracted conventional war in Europe and thereby save U.S. territory from a crushing retaliatory strike.¹²⁴ As recently as September 1986, Colonel K. Kozlov charged that the United States views Europe as a convenient gameboard on which to start and finish a war, as a firebreak that will shield U.S. territory from a retaliatory blaze.¹²⁵ Marshal Kulikov and others have repeatedly stressed that the United States and NATO further intend to conduct combat action only on the territory of the Warsaw Pact countries.¹²⁶

According to Colonel Alekseyev in late 1986, joint U.S. and NATO exercises prove that the political objectives of a European war can be achieved by the first strategic operation in the main, Central European TVD, as well as by operations in other European TVDs and in the Atlantic.¹²⁷ As *Foreign Military Review* put it in 1985, U.S. and NATO strategists believe that the outcome of a future war on the European continent will be decided in the Central European TVD.¹²⁸

Over the years, changes in Soviet doctrine have often been revealed through changes in standard Soviet formulas. Critical among these in Soviet military thought is the course-and-outcome formula, or those factors that are said to influence the course and outcome of a future war. Writing in *Red Star* in 1979, General-Major R. G. Simonyan held that the course and outcome of a war on the European continent will depend on the course and outcome of combat action in the Central European TVD.¹²⁹ As recently as late 1986, Colonel K. Kozlov echoed Simonyan's formula and thereby affirmed that the situation is no different today.¹³⁰

Writing in the *Military-Historical Journal* in 1986, General-Lieutenant Aleksandrov explained that the late 1970s and early 1980s were characterized by new conditions that led to a fine-tuning of the concepts of "general" and "limited" war. "General" war now meant an armed conflict between the superpowers and their blocs in which all of the resources of the belligerents are used and which threatens their very existence as states. "Limited" war now meant an armed conflict between two or more countries that does not become "general."¹³¹ But in a 1986 article in *Foreign Military Review* entitled "Conducting Operations Using Conventional Weapons," Lieutenant-Colonel

V. Sidorov became even more explicit. Until recently, he wrote, the United States and NATO viewed a limited war in Europe as a stage in a conflict that would escalate to general war. Now the West has adopted a new strategy, one that recognizes the possibility of conducting a limited war against the Warsaw Pact as *an independent kind of warfare*.¹³² As the culmination of post-Tula shifts in doctrine and capabilities, the concept of an independent, conventional, high-tech war that includes neither the territories nor the nuclear forces of the superpowers may well be the essence of the new revolution in Soviet military affairs.

The most prominent Soviet military figures have already acknowledged that new theory is becoming new practice in the Soviet military establishment. Marshal Ogarkov asserted in 1983 that the Soviet Armed Forces are developing methods of combat action "under conditions where the opponent uses precision combat complexes, new means of reconnaissance and radioelectronic combat, and automated systems of guiding weapons and commanding troops."¹³³ In early 1985, Chief of the General Staff Akhromeyev wrote that "the inevitability of a retaliatory nuclear strike and its catastrophic consequences" have convinced the probable opponent to concentrate on developing conventional weapons that are characterized by greater effectiveness in yield, range, and accuracy. Soviet military science has not ignored these trends, he continues, and "takes them into account in the training and command and control of troops."¹³⁴ Marshal Kulikov has stated that the fraternal countries of the Warsaw Pact are devoting great attention to developing new methods of combat action for conditions in which the opponent uses "new precision, conventional weapons systems (reconnaissance-strike complexes, . . . etc.), new means of intelligence and radioelectronic combat, and automated command-and-control systems for weapons and troops."¹³⁵

Writing in 1984 in *Kommunist of the Armed Forces*, Marshal Petrov also charged that the United States and NATO are developing a new generation of conventional weapons at a rapid pace. The imperialists, he wrote, are equipping their armies with precision weapons systems, including long-range reconnaissance-strike complexes, and new means of command-and-control, air defense, and radioelectronic combat. As a result, he continued, "the criteria for effectiveness of combat means are changing. Taking this into account, the command of the U.S. armed forces is developing new concepts for the conduct of war. And we must not ignore all of this in the training of our troops."¹³⁶ Colonel-General M. A. Gareyev wrote in his 1985 book that "the upgrading and stockpiling of nuclear-missile weapons have reached the point where their mass use in war could issue in catastrophic consequences for both sides." Under these conditions, the West counts on fighting "a relatively long war

with conventional weapons, and above all new types of precision weapons."¹³⁷ In present-day conditions, he wrote elsewhere, Soviet military science itself "must more actively determine the most important directions for the development of weapons and technology" ¹³⁸

Western analysts are in turn documenting more and more changes in Soviet strategy, operational art, force structure, and weapons modernization that point clearly to a new revolution in the sphere of conventional weaponry. Petersen and Hines wrote in 1983 that the Soviets had already expanded and adjusted the structure of their armed forces "to accommodate operational concepts that support the conventional offensive," and that "the extent of these structural changes suggests that this latest phase in the evolution of Soviet strategy is already quite mature."¹³⁹

By the time Marshal Ogarkov had published his revised description of the modern theater operation, the Soviets had already deployed a new generation of precision, enhanced-range, dual-capable SRBMs in the Central European TVD, where the course and outcome of combat action will determine the course and outcome of a war on the European continent. As Dennis Gormley noted in late 1985, improvements in missile accuracy and conventional warhead effectiveness of these SRBMs "foreshadow the capacity to furnish conventional solutions for nuclear problems" in a future war.¹⁴⁰ The 1986 edition of *Soviet Military Power* confirms that with conventional warheads and guidance systems, Soviet long-range cruise missiles such as the SS-NX-24 "would pose a significant non-nuclear threat to U.S. and Eurasian airfields and nuclear weapons."¹⁴¹ Advances in warhead capabilities, accuracy, and reliability are likewise expected in the Soviet SRBM force. Combined-arms commanders would then have "enhanced non-nuclear targeting options, and more flexible and survivable SRBMs."¹⁴² The new generation of Soviet SRINF missiles can likewise be employed effectively with conventional warheads, which will give the Soviets "a formidable conventional deep-strike system."¹⁴³ If armed with conventional warheads and used preemptively against U.S. and NATO theater nuclear means, these systems could confront the West with either the "use-them-or-lose-them" dilemma or the loss of limited nuclear options altogether.

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23. FitzGerald, *Changing Soviet Doctrine*.
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27. Ogarkov, "Unfading Glory," p. 26.
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